








Functionalism is often used to identify mental states with physical states. A particularly powerful case is Lewis’s analytical functionalism. Kripke’s view seriously challenges any such identification. The dispute between Kripke and Lewis’s views boils down to whether the term ‘pain’ is rigid or nonrigid. It is a strong intuition of ours that if it feels like pain it is pain, and vice versa, so that ‘pain’ should designate, with respect to every possible world, all and only states felt as pain. Hence, in order to settle the dispute, we need to check which of the two – Kripke's use of 'pain' as rigid, or Lewis’s use of 'pain' as nonrigid – better meets this intuition. I show that, despite crucial differences in both their semantic and metaphysical assumptions, surprisingly, both views meet this intuition equally well. Thus it appears that this question of rigidity cannot, in principle, be solved, and so, at least with respect to this particular dispute, the jury is still out on whether mental states are identical to physical states.​[1]​ 

1.	Introduction
A major question in the philosophy of mind is whether mental states are identical to physical states. Lewis’s analytical functionalism offers a particularly powerful way of identifying the two. Kripke’s view seriously challenges any such identification. Kripke's argument against functionalism rests on the assumption that 'pain' is rigid. Lewis’s functionalism entails that 'pain' is non-rigid. Lewis charges against Kripke that if 'pain' were rigid, this would have the unwelcome consequence that 'pain' would fail to designate (counterfactual) states which are felt as pain. So the dispute could be settled by determining whether 'pain' is rigid or not. Specifically, should 'pain' be proved rigid, Lewis’s functionalism would be refuted, and Kripke's strong challenge to the mental-physical identification would be reinforced. By contrast, should 'pain' be proved non-rigid, Kripke's challenge would dissolve, and Lewis’s functionalist identity claim would be strongly reinforced. 
But how can the rigidity or nonrigidity of 'pain' be determined? Lewis's above charge against Kripke's view provides a good lead; we have a strong modal intuition that 'pain' should at least designate, with respect to every possible world, all states felt as pain. In addition, clearly, 'pain' must not designate any state that is not felt as pain. Put together, 'pain' should designate, with respect to every possible world, all and only states felt as pain. Thus, in order to settle the Kripke-Lewis dispute over the identity theory, we need to check which of the two – Kripke's use of 'pain' as rigid, or Lewis's use of 'pain' as nonrigid – has the designation that better meets our modal intuitions. 
The aim of this paper is to do just that. To achieve this goal, I reconstruct the positions by tracking the exact semantic and metaphysical assumptions of each. I shall argue that despite crucial differences in both their semantic and metaphysical assumptions, interestingly, both views entail the exact same designation of 'pain' with respect to different possible worlds, which is just the intuitive designation specified above. It thus follows that (a) Kripke's view does not commit the error attributed to it by Lewis; and, more importantly, (b) it appears that this question of rigidity cannot, in principle, be solved, so we need to look for other ways to decide between these rival positions about identity. 
The discussion that follows divides into five sections: In section 2, I describe the Kripke-Lewis debate over the identity theory of mind; in sections 3 and 4, I present my proposed reconstruction, and apply it to examine the two rival positions; section 5 is a close examination of Lewis's argument against Kripke; and section 6 concludes the discussion.

2.	Background
Functionalism is the view that mental states consist not in their internal features but in the way they function in a system. There are by now quite a few versions of functionalism. Analytical functionalism – originally put forward by Lewis​[2]​ and Armstrong​[3]​ – famously uses this basic functionalist idea to identify mental states with physical states. The identification is achieved in two simple stages. First, it is claimed that what makes some state into a certain type of mental state is the causal role that it plays. For example, pain is taken to be the state that is caused by bodily injury and which is likely to cause winces and groans (or something along these lines), or, in short, the state that occupies the causal ‘pain-role.’ Next, the mental state is identified with that which occupies the functional role,​[4]​ e.g., if the occupant of the pain role is, say, C-fibre firing,​[5]​ then pain, as a type of a mental state, is identified with the type C-fibre firing.​[6]​ 
Adding the further physicalist assumption that the world is ultimately inhabited by physical phenomena, i.e., that every mental role (indeed, every role in general) is occupied by some physical occupant (for these are the only occupants to be found), results in an overall identification of the mental with the physical. As Lewis succinctly summarises it: 

The definitive characteristic of any (sort of) experience as such is its causal role, its syndrome of most typical causes and effects. But we materialists believe that these causal roles which belong by analytic necessity to experiences belong in fact to certain physical states. Since those physical states possess the definitive characteristics of experience, they must be the experiences.​[7]​

Kripke seriously challenges any such identity claim. His argument against the type-type version of identity​[8]​ is based on the alleged rigid designation of the terms involved in identity statements like 'pain = C-fibre firing' (i.e., each is said to designate the same referent in all possible worlds).​[9]​ Now, if any two rigid terms fail to designate the same referent in some possible world, it follows that they fail to designate the same referent in all possible worlds. But prima facia, it seems at least possible that C-fibre firing should exist without being felt as pain, i.e., it seems that there is some possible world in which the reference of 'pain' differs from that of 'C-fibre firing'. Which would entail that the reference of the two terms differs in all possible worlds, and, ipso facto, in the actual world. In other words, if, as seems to be the case, pain and C-fibre firing might have been distinct (i.e., there is a possible world in which they are distinct), then they are actually distinct. So unless the strong intuition of the possible distinctness can be explained away, the identity of pain with C-fibre firing (or with any other physical type for that matter) should be rejected. 
Lewis counterattacks Kripke's position about mental types by denying the rigidity of terms like 'pain'. His argument proceeds as follows.​[10]​ When one is in pain, there is some state, say C, that occupies the pain role and that is called 'pain'. Now consider a counterfactual situation in which a different state, say D, occupies that same pain-role. If 'pain' is rigid and designates C, it must not designate anything distinct from C; in particular, it must not designate D,​[11]​ viz., D is not pain. Yet C is pain. So, says Lewis, if C is pain and D is not, then – since any pain is easily distinguishable from anything which is not pain – C and D should be easily distinguishable. But C and D occupy the same pain-role, i.e., they are felt the same way (indeed, for Lewis, being felt as pain is just occupying the pain role).​[12]​ So C and D are not easily distinguishable. Hence it cannot be true that 'pain' is rigid. So Kripke's position about mental types is wrong.
Overall then, it seems that the Kripke-Lewis debate over the identity of mental states to physical states boils down to whether mental terms like 'pain' are rigid or not. But how can the question of rigidity be decided? Central to Lewis's claim for the nonrigidity of 'pain' is his charge that if 'pain' were rigid, it would fail to designate a counterfactual state felt as pain, namely, D. And such designation violates our modal intuitions about pain. This suggests that the way to determine whether 'pain' is rigid or not, is to check the designation of 'pain' that is entailed by each view – both in the actual and in counterfactual worlds – and see whether this designation conforms to our intuitions about pain. But what are our intuitions about pain? As Lewis's argument suggests, 'pain' should at least designate all states felt as pain. In addition, 'pain' clearly should not designate any state which is not felt as pain. We can thus state the following minimal requirement from any theory of pain: 

(R)	'Pain' should designate, with respect to every possible world, all and only 
states felt as pain. 

Thus, in order to settle the Lewis-Kripke dispute over the identity theory of mind, we need to check which of the two – Lewis’s functionalist use of 'pain' as nonrigid, or Kripke's use of 'pain' as rigid – better conforms to R. 
So we need to find the reference of ‘pain’ in different possible worlds, according to each position. As will be illustrated below, this is easily achieved by tracking the semantic and metaphysical assumptions that lie behind each position. So first, I need to quickly explain what I mean by ‘semantic assumptions’ and ‘metaphysical assumptions’ in the present context. 

3.	The method of reconstruction
We begin with semantic assumptions. Let us use the following definitions. 

A term is 'descriptive' iff it is associated with some description, and designates, with respect to every counterfactual world, that which fits the description in that world (e.g., 'the author of Naming and Necessity'). 

A term is 'nondescriptive' iff it picks out its reference in the actual world and it is then stipulated to designate, with respect to every counterfactual world, just that same actual referent, i.e., regardless of description (e.g., arguably​[13]​, 'Kripke'). 





'The author of Naming and Necessity'	'The successor of five'de facto rigid	'Saul Kripke' de jure rigid
Nonrigid	Rigid

We move on now to the metaphysical assumptions that will concern us here. These have to do with the relation between a property and the entity that instantiates it. We shall employ the following definitions. 
With respect to an object x that instantiates a property F, 

F is necessary for x iff for every possible world w, if x exists in w, then x instantiates F in w. 

F is sufficient for x iff for every possible world w, if F is instantiated in w, then it is instantiated by nothing other than x in w. 

For example, (according to commonsense intuitions,) being a son of John D. Lewis is necessary for David Lewis, since there is no possible world where David fails to have this property (but it is not sufficient for being David Lewis, since David’s brother Donald also has this property); being the father of David is sufficient for John D. Lewis, for there is no possible world where this property is had by someone other than John (but it is not necessary for John, for he might not have fathered David). Being the author of On the Plurality of Worlds is neither necessary nor sufficient for David Lewis. Being the sum of 2 and 3 is both necessary and sufficient for 5. 
We shall now use these two distinctions to reconstruct the two rival positions. 

4.	Analysing and Comparing the two Positions
The debate we are concerned with focuses on type-identity; more specifically, on whether pain is identical to a type of a physical phenomenon (e.g., C-fibre firing). Thus any mention of referents, occupants and the like will be of them qua types.​[16]​ 
We begin with Lewis's view. The crux of Lewis’s analytical functionalism lies in taking mental terms like 'pain' to mean, 'that which occupies the pain-role'. This has both semantic and metaphysical implications. 
From a semantic viewpoint, 'pain' is taken to abbreviate a description, namely, 'that which occupies the pain-role'. 'Pain' thus designates, with respect to every possible world, that which fits this description in that world. Hence, 'pain', for the analytical functionalist, is a descriptive term. 
From a metaphysical perspective, the distinction between role and occupant implies that, (i) it is possible for the actual occupant (e.g., C-fibre firing) not to occupy the pain-role, viz., occupying the pain-role is not necessary for the actual occupant;​[17]​ and, (ii) it is possible for the pain-role to be occupied by something other than the actual occupant, viz., occupying the pain-role is not sufficient for the actual occupant. (As is clearly exemplified in the case described in Lewis's argument against Kripke.)​[18]​ In other words, Lewis’s functionalism assumes that occupying the pain-role is neither necessary (i.e., it is contingent,) nor sufficient for the actual occupant of the pain-role.​[19]​ 
Now, as mentioned above, on Lewis’s view, being a pain, i.e., the instantiation of the property of being felt as pain, is just occupying the causal pain-role.​[20]​ So the assumption that occupying the pain-role is neither necessary nor sufficient for the actual occupant of the pain-role amounts to the assumption that the property of being felt as pain is neither necessary nor sufficient for that which instantiates that property.​[21]​ 
What about Kripke's position? What are the semantic and metaphysical assumptions that underlie it? The answers to both questions can be found in the following passage, in which Kripke compares 'pain' with 'heat'.  

In the case of the identity of heat with molecular motion the important consideration was that although ‘heat’ is a rigid designator, the reference of that designator was determined by an accidental property of the referent, namely the property of producing in us the sensation S. It is thus possible that a phenomenon should have been rigidly designated in the same way as a phenomenon of heat, with its reference also picked out by means of the sensation S, without that phenomenon being heat and therefore without its being molecular motion. Pain, on the other hand, is not picked out by one of its accidental properties; rather it is picked out by the property of being pain itself, by its immediate phenomenological quality. Thus pain, unlike heat, is not only rigidly designated by ‘pain’ but the reference of the designator is determined by an essential property of the referent.​[22]​

Thus it is clear that 'heat' fixes its reference in the actual world (namely, on molecular motion) by means of a criterion/description – i.e., the instantiation of a (contingent) property – and then goes on to designate, with respect to every possible world, just that same referent, regardless of the original criterion/description (i.e., regardless of whether or not molecular motion in that possible world is hot). So 'heat' is de jure rigid, viz., it is nondescriptive.​[23]​ What about ‘pain’? We are told that ‘the reference of [this] designator is determined by an essential property of the referent.’ Thus, like ‘heat’, 'pain' too fixes its reference in the actual world by means of a criterion/description – namely, the instantiation of the (in this case essential) property of being felt as pain, and then goes on to designate, with respect to every possible world, just that same referent. So 'pain', like 'heat', is de jure rigid, viz., it is semantically nondescriptive.​[24]​ 
This passage also teaches us about the metaphysical assumptions that lie behind Kripke's position. We learn that being felt as pain, unlike being hot, is an essential, i.e., necessary, property, of any state that instantiates it. Furthermore, a few sentences on, Kripke says that 'if any phenomenon is picked out in exactly the same way that we pick out pain, then that phenomenon is pain'.​[25]​ In other words, for something to be pain, it suffices that it has the property of being felt as pain. So the property of being felt as pain is both necessary and sufficient for whatever instantiates this property. 




Lewis’s functionalism 	Being felt as pain is neither necessary nor sufficient for that which instantiates this property.	'Pain' is descriptive.
Kripke’s position	Being felt as pain is both necessary and sufficient for that which instantiates this property.	'Pain' is nondescriptive. 

Having tracked the semantic and metaphysical assumptions that lie behind the two rival views, we are now in a position to easily accomplish our main task, namely, settling the Kripke-Lewis debate by answering whether Kripke's position – which takes 'pain' to be rigid, or Lewis's functionalist position – which takes 'pain' to be nonrigid, meets requirement R, i.e., that 'pain' designates, with respect to every possible world, all and only states felt as pain. 

4.1	Meeting requirement R
We begin with Kripke's position. Kripke's semantic assumption is that 'pain' is nondescriptive, i.e., 'pain' picks out its reference in the actual world and is then stipulated to designate, with respect to every counterfactual world, just that actual referent (i.e., qua type). Let us call this actual referent, whatever its nature, C. So 'pain' has to designate, with respect to every possible world, that which is identical to the actual painful C. But how can we tell whether or not something is identical to the actual painful C? This is where metaphysics steps in. Kripke’s metaphysical assumption is that being felt as pain is necessary and sufficient for anything that instantiates this property. Now C instantiates this property. So being identical to the actual painful C amounts just to instantiating the property of being felt as pain. It follows that 'pain' designates, with respect to every possible world, all and only states felt as pain. So Kripke's position in fact entails R, and does not violate it. Contrary to Lewis’s protest. 
Since 'pain', when considered rigid, has the designation required by R, it would seem that 'pain' when considered nonrigid should fail to have that same designation, viz., it would seem that it is Lewis’s functionalism that violates R. But does it? 
Recall that 'pain' for the analytical functionalist is a descriptive term that designates, with respect to every possible world, whatever fits the description, 'occupies the pain-role'. And since, for Lewis, occupying the pain-role is just the instantiation of the property of being felt as pain, it follows straightforwardly that 'pain' designates, with respect to every possible world, all and only states felt as pain. So requirement R is successfully met by Lewis’s functionalism too.​[26]​ 
We may thus conclude so far that despite the differences in both their semantic and metaphysical assumptions, interestingly, both Kripke and Lewis's positions entail the very same designation of 'pain' with respect to different possible worlds, which is just the designation required by our modal intuitions, as specified in R. 
At this point, this may look rather puzzling: How can it be that on Kripke’s view ‘pain’ is rigid and on Lewis’s functionalist view ‘pain’ is nonrigid, and yet both views entail the very same designation of ‘pain’ with respect to every possible world? 
However, upon further reflection, there need be no puzzlement: On both views, the one thing that all referents of 'pain' share in common is that they instantiate the property of being felt as pain. On Kripke's view, being felt as pain is both necessary and sufficient for the states that instantiate it. It thus follows that all states felt as pain, i.e., all referents of 'pain' in different possible worlds, are identical (qua types), and hence that 'pain' is rigid. By contrast, Lewis's functionalist view assumes that the property of being felt as pain is neither necessary nor sufficient for the states that instantiate it. It thus follows that, on Lewis's view, the referents of 'pain' in different possible worlds are not all identical, and hence, that 'pain' is nonrigid. So it all fits nicely.​[27]​
Finally, we have seen that Kripke's view entails R, and hence does not commit the error attributed to it by Lewis. So there must be something wrong with Lewis's argument. This is what we attend to last.  

5.	Lewis’s argument against Kripke’s position
Here is Lewis's original argument against Kripke’s position (outlined at the end of section 2 above). 

Kripke vigorously intuits that some names for mental states, in particular 'pain', are rigid designators: that is, it's not contingent what their referents are. I myself intuit no such thing, so the non-rigidity imputed by causal-role analyses troubles me not at all.
Here is an argument that 'pain' is not a rigid designator. Think of some occasion when you were in severe pain, unmistakable and unignorable. All will agree, except for some philosophers and faith healers, that there is a state that actually occupies the pain role (or near enough); that it is called 'pain'; and that you were in it on that occasion. For now, I assume nothing about the nature of this state, or about how it deserves its name. Now consider an unactualized situation in which it is some different state that occupies the pain role in place of the actual occupant; and in which you were in that different state; and which is otherwise as much like the actual situation as possible. Can you distinguish the actual situation from this unactualized alternative? I say not, or not without laborious investigation. But if 'pain' is a rigid designator, then the alternative situation is one in which you were not in pain, so you could distinguish the two very easily. So 'pain' is not a rigid designator.​[28]​

Lewis thus offers a reductio argument against Kripke. Put schematically, it reads as follows. 
	In w1 (the actual world) there is a state that occupies the pain-role – let us call it C; 			Ass.
	Let w2 be a possible world where the pain-role is occupied by some state other than C – call it D (otherwise, w2 is just like w1);			Ass.
	C and D occupy the same pain-role, i.e., they are felt exactly the same.​[29]​ Hence C and D are phenomenologically indistinguishable; 			1, 2
	'Pain' designates C in w1, i.e., C is pain; 			1
	C is distinct from D; 			2
	Hence, if 'pain' is rigid (and designates C in w1), then it does not designate D in w2,​[30]​ i.e., D in w2 is not pain;​[31]​			5
	Something which is pain is easily distinguishable from something which is not; 			Ass.
	Hence, if 'pain' is rigid, C is easily distinguishable from D.			4, 6, 7
	But C and D are not easily distinguishable; 			3
	Hence, 'pain' is not a rigid designator. It is nonrigid; 			8, 9
So Kripke is wrong.

Premises (1)-(4) are likely to attract no special opposition from Kripke. The problem arises with premise (5), which states that C is distinct from D, and this is despite the fact that both are felt as pain. Thus premise (5) implies that being felt as pain is not sufficient for C, for otherwise the mere fact that D is felt as pain would suffice to make D identical to C. Now although this is in agreement with Lewis’s own functionalist metaphysical assumption, namely, that being felt as pain is neither necessary nor sufficient for the state that instantiates this property, it is nonetheless not something that Kripke will approve of. For, as we have seen, according to the metaphysical assumptions of Kripke’s position, being felt as pain is a (necessary and) sufficient property, and hence the fact that C in w1 and D in w2 are both felt as pain does suffice to render them the same. Consequently, according to Kripke’s position, the rigid designator 'pain' does designate painful D in w2. In which case the problem indicated by Lewis does not arise. 
Thus, the rigidity of 'pain', when coupled with Kripke's own metaphysics, does not lead to the unacceptable results. It is only when such rigidity is joined with metaphysical assumptions that contradict Kripke's own metaphysics, that the problem arises. In other words, what Lewis's argument shows is that a position that has both the following assumptions – (a) metaphysics: being felt as pain is not a sufficient property of the state that instantiate it; and, (b) semantics: 'pain' is nondescriptive and hence rigid – leads to unacceptable results. This is a position that weds Kripke’s semantics to Lewis’s functionalist metaphysics, and it is indeed an indefensible position. However, it is not Kripke’s position. So Lewis's argument fails to show that Kripke's position as it stands is wrong.​[32]​




Kripke’s position	Being felt as pain is necessary and sufficient.	'Pain' is nondescriptive.	Yes. 'Pain' designates all and only states felt as pain. 	'Pain' is rigid
Lewis's functionalism	Being felt as pain is neither necessary nor sufficient.	'Pain' is descriptive. 	Yes. 'Pain' designates all and only states felt as pain. 	'Pain' is nonrigid




The Kripke-Lewis debate over whether mental states are identical to physical states boils down to the question of whether mental terms like 'pain' are rigid or not: Kripke’s argument against functionalism is based on his assumption that ‘pain’ is a rigid designator; Lewis claims that if ‘pain’ were rigid then this would lead to the unacceptable consequence that 'pain' fails to designate a counterfactual state felt as pain, i.e., that a state felt as pain is not pain. This charge made by Lewis seems to rely on the strong modal intuition, that 'pain' should designate, with respect to every possible world, all and only states felt as pain – an intuition which we abbreviated as 'R'. Thus the question has been whether 'pain' considered as rigid (as done by Kripke), or as nonrigid (as done by Lewis’s functionalism) has the intuitive designation required by R. 
In order to answer this question, we have reconstructed the positions, by tracking the exact metaphysical and semantic assumptions that lie behind each. Such reconstruction revealed that despite differences in both their metaphysical and semantic assumptions, both positions in fact meet R equally well, which left this question of rigidity unsolvable. A further analysis revealed that Lewis's objection refutes a position similar to, but crucially different from, Kripke's. The refuted position is a hybrid position, combining Kripke’s semantic assumption with Lewis’s functionalist metaphysical assumption. So Kripke’s position is unharmed by Lewis’s argument. 
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